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DIPLOMACY AS A MEANS TO SUCCESSFULLY DISARM 
NORTH KOREA 
JADE PALOMINO*
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite North Korea’s agreement on February 13, 2007 to shut 
down its nuclear reactor and allow United Nations inspectors back 
into the country,1 in addition to the country’s participation in the 
sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in September 2007,2 the 
likelihood of successfully disarming North Korea is quite dismal at 
the time of this writing.  On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a 
multistage rocket3 and, little more than a month later, it conducted 
its second nuclear test.4  On April 14, 2009, North Korea’s foreign 
minister announced that the country was permanently quitting the 
Six-Party Talks and resuming their nuclear enrichment program,5 
which reached its “concluding stages” on September 3, 2009.6
This Comment argues that North Korea has little incentive to 
comply with the disarmament agreements to which it is party 
 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
1 See North Korea’s Nuclear Activities: Timeline, TELEGRAPH, May 25, 2009, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/5381109/Nort
h-Koreas-nuclear-activities-timeline.html (providing a timeline of North Korea’s 
nuclear activities and international attempts to restrict them). 
2 Schedule of the Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce 
/event/2007/9/1175582_856.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
3 See generally Peter Spiegel, U.S. Warns North Korea Against Nuclear Activity, 
WALL ST. J., May 30, 2009, at A8 (discussing the fallout is the United States 
following North Korea’s missile test). 
4 See Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Says It Tested Nuclear Device, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 25, 2009, at A1 (describing the second nuclear test conducted by North 
Korea). 
5 See Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Started Uranium Programs in 1990s, South 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07 
/world/asia/07korea.html (discussing the history of North Korea’s uranium 
program). 
6 David E. Sanger, North Korea Reports Advances in Enriching Uranium, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2009, at A3. 
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because the enforcement mechanisms currently available under 
international law are ineffective and the agreements themselves 
allow for abuse.  The underlying source of North Korea’s 
unwillingness to disarm, however, is the United State’s hostile 
diplomatic policy towards the country, which undermines the 
terms of these already vulnerable agreements.  The United States 
must therefore abandon its antagonistic and uncompromising 
approach if it hopes to successfully disarm North Korea. 
Part 2 of this Comment outlines the various disarmament 
treaties and agreements North Korea was party to and outlines 
their shortcomings.  Part 3 discusses the enforcement mechanisms 
available under international law to bring North Korea into 
compliance with these commitments and their inherent 
weaknesses.  Part 4 explores the United States’ past diplomatic 
approach to North Korea through the framework of the Six-Party 
Talks and reaffirms its ineffectiveness.  Part 5 offers creative 
diplomacy as a solution to the problem of North Korean 
disarmament. 
2. NORTH KOREA’S DISCORDANT RELATIONSHIP WITH 
DISARMAMENT TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 
North Korea’s disregard for international disarmament 
agreements is evidenced by its violation of the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, the Agreed Framework, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency Safeguards, and the North-South Declaration on the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  Thus, if the United 
States cannot instill a sense of respect for international law in the 
North Korean government, it must, at least, make North Korea 
leaders respect the United States, one of the major parties it forms 
these agreements with, if it hopes to disarm North Korea. 
The Nonproliferation Treaty7 (“NPT”) was formed on July 1, 
1968 with the purpose of accomplishing the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy,8 as well as non-proliferation9 and disarmament.10
 
7 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. 
  North 
8 See id. art. IV(1) (acknowledging the “[i]nalienable right of all the Parties . . . 
to develop research, production and use . . . nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes”). 
9 See id. art. I–II (declaring State parties’ promise to neither transfer nor 
receive “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices”). 
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Korea joined it as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1985,11 ultimately 
withdrawing in 2003.12  Non-weapon parties to the NPT must 
agree to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (“IAEA”) that allow the agency to monitor for 
compliance.13  North Korea joined the IAEA in 1974,14 but 
ultimately withdrew in 1994.15
In 1992, to fulfill its obligations under the NPT, North Korea 
announced the amount of plutonium—the ingredient used to make 
nuclear weapons—it had separated from damaged fuel rods.
 
16  
IAEA inspectors discovered that the levels of plutonium made 
exceeded those actually reported.17  When IAEA inspectors went to 
further investigate the misinformation in January 1993, North 
Korea did not allow them to enter18
 
10 See id. art. VI (stating that states must pursue “[n]egotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control”). 
 in contravention of its 
11 See IAEA and DPRK: Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, IAEA.ORG, 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/fact_sheet_may2003.shtml 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011) [hereinafter IAEA Factsheet] (outlining North Korea’s 
nuclear safeguards). 
12 See Andrew Ward, N Korea Quits Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, FIN. 
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003, at 11 (describing North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT 
and the lack of a cohesive response “to the communist state’s suspected nuclear 
weapons programme”). 
13 See NPT, supra note 7, art. III(I) (“Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party 
undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement . . . with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency . . . with a view to preventing diversion of 
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.”). 
14 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 11. 
15 See id. (“Although the withdrawal did not affect [North Korea’s] 
obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, which in the Agency’s view remains 
binding and in force, [North Korea] took the position that it was . . . no longer 
obliged to allow inspectors to carry out their work under the Safeguards 
Agreement.”). 
16 See David Albright, North Korean Plutonium Production, 5 SCI. & GLOBAL 
SECURITY 63, 63 (1994) (describing the history of North Korea’s separation of 
plutonium from damaged fuel rods and potential for future plutonium 
separation). 
17 See id. (noting that North Korea may have separated enough plutonium to 
build one or two nuclear weapons). 
18 See William J. Perry, Proliferation on the Peninsula: Five North Korean Nuclear 
Crises, 607 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 78, 81 (2006) (“[E]vidently 
surprised at the thoroughness of the inspectors, refused them access to the spent 
fuel storage area for more detailed examination.”). 
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Safeguards Agreement.19  Unwilling to honor its commitments, 
North Korea left the IAEA and soon threatened to leave the NPT.20
On January 20, 1992, North Korea signed the North-South 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula under 
which both agreed to refrain from testing, manufacture, 
production, acceptance, possession, storage, deployment, or use of 
nuclear weapons.
 
21  North Korea ignored the provision in the 
declaration that called for a bilateral nuclear inspection regime22 in 
January 1993 when it refused IAEA inspections of its facilities.23
In an attempt to avoid the nuclear threat that North Korea 
presented, the United States negotiated the Agreed Framework, 
which forced North Korea to cease its nuclear program and allow 
inspections in exchange for obtaining two modern nuclear 
reactors.
 
24  In October 2002, North Korea admitted to having a 
clandestine nuclear program in violation of the Agreed Framework 
and the NPT.25
 
19 See Int’l Atomic Energy Ass’n [IAEA], Agreement of 30 January 1992 between 
the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. XLVIII, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/403 
(Jan. 30, 1992) [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement] (“The Agency, in co-operation 
with [North Korea], may send inspectors to verify the design information 
provided to the Agency . . . .”). 
  Two months later, North Korea lifted the freeze on 
its plutonium program and expelled inspectors that were 
20 See Perry, supra note 18, at 81 (stating that North Korea announced their 
withdrawal from the NPT in May 1994). 
21 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, N. Kor.-
S. Kor., Jan. 20, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 569 [hereinafter the North-South Joint Declaration]. 
22 See id. (“The north and south shall make an inspection of objects chosen by 
the other side . . . in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean 
peninsula.”)  
23 See Perry, supra note 18, at 81 (noting that after the inspectors left, North 
Korea began preparations to refuel). 
24 See Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.S.-N. Kor., art. I, Oct. 21, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 
604 [hereinafter Agreed Framework] (stating that the U.S. would provide North 
Korea with a light-water reactor in exchange for North Korea freezing its 
graphite-moderated reactor); see also, THOMAS GRAHAM JR., DISARMAMENT 
SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 235 (2002) 
(describing the goals of the Agreed Framework).  
25 See John S. Park, Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks, 28 WASH. Q. 75, 
76 (2005) (discussing the discovery of North Korea’s nuclear program and the 
United States’ response). 
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supervising the freeze.26  On January 10, 2003, North Korea 
officially withdrew from the NPT.27
The United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia 
participated in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea in August 
2003 in the hopes of negotiating an end to North Korea’s nuclear 
program.
 
28  North Korea refused to attend the fourth round of talks 
in October 2004 because of the “hostile climate created by the US 
[sic].”29  Although these talks continued into February 200730 and 
resulted in a statement in which the United States agreed to end 
trade sanctions in return for North Korea shutting down its nuclear 
program,31 on April 5, 2009, North Korea conducted a satellite 
launch.32  On April 14, 2009, after the United Nations Security 
Council vowed to expand sanctions on the country,33 North Korea 
announced that it would “’never again take part in such [six party] 
talks.’”34
 
26 See Perry, supra note 18, at 83–84 (outlining the events of the “fifth nuclear 
crisis” with North Korea in 2002). 
 
27 See North Korea Leaves Nuclear Pact, CNN.COM, Jan. 10, 2003, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2003-01-10/world/nkorea.treaty_1_nuclear-weapons-
nuclear-pact-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty?_s=PM:asiapcf (noting that “North 
Korea’s announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT is largely symbolic, as it 
has . . . admitted to be secretly pursuing a nuclear weapons program”). 
28 See Jayshree Bajoria, The Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/ (last 
updated July 1, 2009) (describing, among other things, the objectives of the parties 
involved in the Six-Party Talks). 
29 Korean Delegations Hold Bilateral Meeting Ahead of Six-Party Talks, RIA 
NOVOSTI, July 24, 2005, http://en.rian.ru/world/20050724/40963132.html. 
30 See Timeline: N. Korea Nuclear Dispute, CNN, Feb. 13, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/02/10/nkorea.timeline/ (stating 
that North Korea agreed to take the first steps towards nuclear disarmament on 
February 13, 2007). 
31 See Full Text of S. Korea-U.S. Summit Statement, KOR. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/04/116_22786.html 
(providing the full text of the U.S./South Korea Summit Statement).  
32 See Sun-won Park, Pyongyang Fails Again: North Korea’s Third Missile Launch 
and Kim Jong-il’s Miscalculation, BROOKINGS (Apr. 6, 2009), 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0406_north_korea_park.aspx 
(discussing the failures that characterized the launch). 
33 See Geraldine Baum, U.N. Security Council Condemns North Korea Launch, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/14/world/fg-
un-north-korea14 (describing the presidential statement issued by the Security 
Council which criticized the launch and agreed to tighten sanctions). 
34 Mark Landler, North Korea Says It Will Halt Talks and Restart its Nuclear 
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009, at A5 (quoting North Korea’s Foreign 
Ministry). 
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Thus far, North Korea has failed to fulfill any of its obligations 
under international treaties and agreements, which suggests that 
there are limitations to the enforcement mechanisms available and 
flaws in the agreements themselves.  If the United States hopes to 
ensure its security, it must examine and address both of these 
structural weaknesses, as well as the motivations behind North 
Korea’s eagerness to take advantage of them. 
2.1. Weaknesses of Current Disarmament Treaties and Agreements 
According to Article II of the NPT, non-nuclear states cannot 
attempt to obtain nuclear weapons or to manufacture their own.35  
The agreement only focuses on nuclear technology and makes no 
mention of the raw materials necessary to make nuclear weapons.  
North Korea could therefore use the “by-products which . . . 
provide base materials for nuclear weapons.”36  North Korea 
would therefore not be in violation of the NPT when it used the 
fissile material it supposedly produced while party to the 
agreement37 to create a nuclear device after withdrawing from the 
NPT.  The scope of the NPT is thus unnecessarily narrow because 
it restricts the international community’s ability to respond to 
countries’ clear attempts at obtaining nuclear weapons.38
Article IV, section 2 of the NPT states, “[a]ll the Parties to the 
Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in 
the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific 
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy.”
 
39
 
35 NPT, supra note 7, art. II. 
  In other words, the NPT actually promotes the use and 
transfer of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes.  By doing so, 
the NPT provides countries with an easy means of gaining the 
materials they need for nuclear weapons.  Simply put, there exists 
an almost irresistible incentive to manipulate the system. 
36 Helen M. Cousineau, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Global Non-
Proliferation Regime: A U.S. Policy Agenda, 12 B.U. INT’L L.J. 407, 423 (1994). 
37 See SHARON SQUASSONI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21391, NORTH KOREA’S 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 3–4 (2006) (implying that North Korea 
has been reprocessing materials since the early 1990s). 
38 See Matthew Rice, NPT Review Conference Finds Consensus, Issues Document, 
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, June 2000, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act 
/2000_06/nptjun (suggesting that the narrow scope of the treaty is the result of 
broad compromises by nuclear-weapons states regarding disarmament). 
39 NPT, supra note 7, art. IV, para. 2. 
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Article X of the NPT states that, “Each Party shall [with three 
months notice and] in exercising its national sovereignty have the 
right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary 
events . . . have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”40  
There is no intermediate body to ensure that a country’s claim is 
indeed legitimate.  Thus, a country can take advantage of all the 
privileges of being party to the NPT, and leave the treaty as soon 
as it no longer suits the country to be a member.41
Several of the provisions in the IAEA statute are similarly in 
need of redrafting.  For example, to be held liable under Article XI 
of the statute, North Korea’s suspect nuclear program must have 
“started out as an official IAEA project.”
 
42  Article XII clearly states 
that the “rights and responsibilities” or agency safeguards listed in 
the statute apply only “[w]ith respect to any Agency project, or 
other arrangement where the Agency is requested by the parties 
concerned to apply safeguards.”43
Article XII, section A, and Article III, section D, of the IAEA 
Statute further highlight the inability of the statute to effectively 
enforce agency safeguards.  Article III, section D, states that, 
“[s]ubject to the provisions of th[is] Statute . . . the activities of the 
Agency shall be carried out with due observance of the sovereign 
rights of States.”
  Thus, if North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons originated from facilities not controlled and maintained 
by the IAEA, it is difficult to find North Korea in violation of the 
IAEA statute. 
44  Although the phrasing of this provision appears 
to limit a state’s “sovereign rights” to decisions not governed by 
the Statute, Article XII, section A, suggests otherwise.  On its face, 
the Statute requires countries to allow monitoring by inspectors.45
 
40 Id. art. X, para. 1. 
  
Article XII, section A, however, says that the IAEA may only send 
41 See Erik Raines, North Korea: Analyzing the “New” Nuclear Threat, 12 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 349, 363 (2004) (“The language of the withdrawal 
provision is inherently weak . . . as it allows for withdrawing countries to 
subjectively determine what ‘extraordinary events’ have jeopardized its ‘supreme 
interests.’”). 
42 Matthew Liles, Comment, Did Kim Jong-II Break the Law? A Case Study on 
How North Korea Highlights the Flaws of the Non-Proliferation Regime, 33 N.C. J. INT’L 
L. & COM. REG. 103, 121 (2007). 
43 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. XII(A), July 29, 
1957, 8.1 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IAEA Statute]. 
44 Id. art. III(D). 
45 See id. art. XII(A)(6) (describing the Agency’s right to send inspectors into 
recipient states). 
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inspectors into a country after consultation with “the State or States 
concerned.”46
The Agreed Framework of 1994 lacks clarity and therefore 
allows for manipulation by states.  Article IV required North Korea 
to remain in the NPT
  North Korea’s past and present actions demonstrate 
that, if given the choice, North Korea (like all countries) will 
always choose to honor its personal goals over its international 
commitments.  Though respect for state sovereignty is an 
important principle in international law, lawmakers need to find a 
better balance between respecting states’ interests and protecting 
the international community.  The international community 
therefore needs to make nuclear disarmament in North Korea’s 
best interest if it hopes to capitalize upon the nation’s proclivity 
towards basing decisions solely on its own interests.  This can be 
accomplished by offering economic aid or increased trade for 
complying with disarmament treaties. 
47 and also to comply with IAEA Safeguards 
after “a significant portion of the LWR [light water reactor] project 
[was] completed.”48  The agreement also required the United States 
to “make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract 
with the DPRK within six months.”49  While North Korea was 
never really put in the position to deliver on its promise because of 
the United States’ failure to implement many of the provisions in 
the agreement,50 there would have likely been conflicts over what 
constituted “a significant portion” of the project and there likely 
were disagreements over what constituted a “best effort” in 
securing the supply contract.51
 
46 Id. 
  The Agreed Framework’s 
weakness also lies in its lack of implementation plans.  For 
instance, when discussing the project’s financing, the agreement 
states:  “The U.S. will organize . . . an international consortium to 
47 See Agreed Framework, supra note 24, art. IV(1) (specifying North Korea’s 
duty to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons). 
48 Id. art. IV(2)–(3) (emphasis added). 
49 Id. art. I(1) (emphasis added). 
50 See Stalemated LWR Project to Prompt Pyongyang to Restart N-Program, 
PEOPLE’S KOREA, http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/042nd_issue/98051302.htm 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (discussing the conflicts arising from the United States’ 
failure to install civilian nuclear light reactors); see also Selig S. Harrison, Time to 
Leave Korea?, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 62, 63 (describing the United States’ 
failure to phase out economic sanctions because of congressional opposition). 
51 Agreed Framework, supra note 24, art. I(1), IV(3). 
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finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the 
DPRK.”52  There was neither specification as to how much money 
was required of the United States (or who in the United States was 
to provide this financing53
Perhaps the biggest weakness of the Agreed Framework lies in 
its narrow scope:  it only applies to the “5MW(e) reactor, the 
Radiochemical Laboratory . . . the fuel fabrication plant and the 
partially built 50 and 200MW(e) nuclear power plants.”
), nor was there clarification regarding 
how international funding would be solicited. 
54
While the North-South Joint Declaration provides a clear vision 
of its objectives, it does not provide for a means of adjudication, 
enforcement, or penalties.
  If North 
Korea manufactured weapons or reprocessed fuel in facilities other 
than those specified, it would not be liable under the agreement. 
55  Without any compliance mechanisms 
in place, South Korea was left to take whatever it could get from a 
defiant North Korea.56  Another weakness of the Joint Declaration 
lies in its verification system.  Inspections are only permitted on 
“objects chosen” by the side being examined, and must first be 
approved by both sides;57 inspections are not an “inherent right of 
the requesting side.”58
Because many of the disarmament agreements in place require 
the cooperation of North Korea, it is not only important that the 
United States strengthen the authority of these agreements, but it is 
also imperative that the United States abandon its hostile policy 
towards North Korea so as to make North Korea more willing to 
comply. 
  North Korea’s repeated refusals to allow 
inspections would therefore be permissible under this agreement. 
 
52 Id. art. I(1). 
53 See Interview by PBS with William Perry, U.S. Sec. of Def. from 1994–1997 
(Feb. 26, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim 
/interviews/perry.html (describing how, initially, the project was financed by the 
U.S. Department of Defense emergency funds not under Congressional control). 
54 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 11.  
55 See North-South Joint Declaration, supra note 21 (detailing the terms of the 
agreement to denuclearize North and South Korea). 
56 See PETER HAYES & MICHAEL HAMEL-GREEN, THE PATH NOT TAKEN, THE WAY 
STILL OPEN: DENUCLEARIZING THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND NORTHEAST ASIA 16 
(2009), available at http://gc.nautilus.org/Nautilus/australia/apsnet/reports 
/2009/hayes-hamel-green.pdf (reporting that South Korea “reverted to a small 
number of annual inspections with advance warning—an almost meaningless 
inspection arrangement”). 
57 North-South Joint Declaration, supra note 21, art. IV.  
58 HAYES & HAMEL-GREEN, supra note 56, at 16.  
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3. WEAKNESSES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Even if North Korea is found in breach of these agreements and 
treaties, it is not clear whether the remaining parties have any 
means of gaining justice through international law.  An advisory 
opinion issued by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) held 
that the “threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be 
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian 
law.”59
One could claim that the ICJ may not have jurisdiction over the 
trials that occurred on April 5, 2009, and July 4, 2009,
  
60 because 
these were tests of weapons, not actual uses of them in armed 
conflict.  Furthermore, although the ICJ has acknowledged that the 
possession of nuclear weapons “may indeed justify an inference of 
preparedness to use them,”61 and may therefore constitute an 
actionable “threat,” it is unclear whether this is indeed the case for 
North Korea.  North Korea has represented that it only intends to 
use its missiles in self-defense.62
The ICJ does not even support the contention that the 
possession of nuclear weapons is illegal because of the existence of 
treaties like the NPT wherein nuclear-weapon States offer security 
assurances to non-nuclear weapon States.
  There is therefore no real “threat” 
at issue here, because there is neither a sense of immediacy nor an 
identifiable target. 
63
 
59 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, para. 105(2)(E) (July 8). 
  The fact that nuclear-
weapon States are permitted to keep their weaponry and, even use 
it in particular circumstances, proves that “[t]here is in neither 
customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive 
60 See North Korea Missile Tests Defy UN, BBC NEWS, July 4, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8134115.stm (reporting on North Korea’s most 
recent nuclear tests which involved the firing of a series of missiles into the Sea of 
Japan). 
61 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 59, para. 48. 
62 See Richard Sisk, World Trembles as Despot Goes Ballistic. North Korea 
Unleashes Blast and Could Hit Button on a Second, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10, 2006, at 7 
(quoting Pak Gil Yon, a North Korean diplomat, as saying that nuclear tests afford 
his country a “defense capability ”). 
63 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 59, para. 
59(c) (discussing assurances made by the United States, United Kingdom, and 
USSR to assist non-nuclear weapon states that are the victims of nuclear 
weapons). 
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and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
as such.”64  As evidenced in the aforementioned paragraph, the ICJ 
was only willing to acknowledge that these actions are generally 
contrary to the rules of international law, and was quick to concede 
that their threat and use may be permissible in “extreme 
circumstance[s] of self-defence.”65
The Martens Clause is a part of the laws of armed conflict and 
is subject to a variety of interpretations.
 
66
international law
  At its most restricted 
reading, the Clause states that customary international law, those 
unwritten aspects of  that derive from convention, 
continues to apply after the adoption of a treaty.67  Under a wider 
interpretation, the Clause provides that things that are not 
explicitly prohibited by a treaty are not ipso facto permitted.68  If 
the aforementioned ICJ opinion is indeed a summation and 
consensus of the general practice of states, then under the Martens 
Clause, Korea is not liable for the possession or testing of nuclear 
weapons—a practice found in countries like the United States69 
and France.70  Furthermore, even if North Korea were found in 
violation of a provision of the ICJ advisory opinion, the very status 
of the document as such makes it non-binding.71
 
64 Id. para. 105(2)(B) (noting the abovementioned conclusion by an 11-3 vote). 
  Advisory 
opinions are only binding after they are ratified or incorporated 
65 Id. at 263. 
66 See Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 
INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 125, 126 (1997) (describing various interpretations of 
the Martens Clause and how it has been used historically in international law). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 See Gallery of U.S. Nuclear Tests, NUCLEAR WEAPON ARCHIVE, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/ (last updated Feb. 6, 2001) 
(discussing the high number of nuclear tests the United States has conducted by 
revealing that “1054 nuclear tests” were recorded “[b]etween 16 July 1945 and 23 
September 1992”). 
70 See Fifteenth Anniversary of France's Last Nuclear Test, CTBTO 
Preparatory Comm'n (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.ctbto.org/press-
centre/highlights/2011/fifteenth-anniversaryof-frances-last-nuclear-test/ (noting 
that France has carried out 210 nuclear tests, the last of which took place on 
January 27, 1996). 
71 See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 
83–84 (5th ed. 1995) (detailing that although a state can be a party to a statute and 
therefore qualified to be a party to litigation, jurisdiction is not necessarily 
conferred to the Court). 
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into a separate agreement,72
Although one would believe North Korea could be held liable 
under the principle of good faith for its numerous nuclear 
transgressions, the rule is too expansive to limit the country.  It 
holds that, once a state makes a promise, it has the duty to fulfill it 
so that “interested States may . . . place confidence in them.”
 and this has not yet been 
accomplished in North Korea. 
73  
Furthermore, “an international obligation assumed by unilateral 
declaration” is “binding;”74 in other words, when a state agent 
makes a declaration and thereby creates a reasonable reliance from 
others that it will meet its promise, it is obliged to deliver on it.  
Although this appears to be a reasonable safeguard against empty 
promises by world leaders, it offers them the opportunity to escape 
existing international obligations simply by making new 
declarations.  It is not clear, therefore, whether North Korea 
violated the 1994 Agreed Framework and, by extension, the 
principle of good faith when it announced it would restart its 
plutonium production in December 2002.75
The IAEA is similar to a United States government agency in 
the sense that it “must look elsewhere to enforce its 
determinations.”
  On the one hand, 
Korea has a duty to follow through on its commitment to freeze its 
nuclear program.  On the other hand, however, Korea created a 
competing obligation to unfreeze the program through its 
unilateral declaration. 
76  It may only suspend the “privileges and rights 
of membership”77 of noncompliant members and must look to the 
I.C.J.,78
 
72 See How the Court Works, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=6 (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (revealing that a 
state must consent to the jurisdiction of the Court in order for the decision to be 
binding). 
 the United Nations General Assembly, or the Security 
73 Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 473 (Dec. 20). 
74 Id. 
75 See Benjamin Friedman, Fact Sheet: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 
CTR. FOR DEF. INFO., http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/nk-fact-sheet.cfm (last updated 
Jan. 23, 2003) (recounting the history of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program). 
76 Liles, supra note 42, at 135. 
77 IAEA Statute, supra note 43, art. XII(C). 
78 See id. art. XVII(A) (declaring that the International Court of Justice will 
review disputes over the “interpretation or application” of the statute that are not 
settled by negotiation). 
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Council for actual enforcement.79
With respect to North Korea, the problem with the Security 
Council lies in the right of member states to challenge council 
decisions.
  North Korea therefore has little 
reason to respect or obey a group with so little power itself. 
80  Under international law, “a state has a right to 
challenge the validity of acts of international organizations” (i.e. 
the Security Council) both during and following the “decision-
making process.”81
The weaknesses of both the treaties and the enforcement 
mechanisms currently in place suggest that the United States 
cannot disarm North Korea solely through legal means.  The 
United States must use the extralegal tools of diplomacy and 
respect if it hopes to accomplish its goal. 
  If countries can question the legality of 
Security Council decisions, it is difficult to draw the line between 
this right to challenge resolutions and the competing duty to 
comply with Security Council decisions.  This escape clause 
functions as yet another way North Korea can ignore its 
international disarmament obligations. 
4. THE SIX-PARTY NUCLEAR TALKS AS A MODEL OF THE UNITED 
STATES’ INEFFECTIVE APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS 
UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
In order to resolve the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, the 
United States must resume diplomatic negotiations through a 
process similar to the Six-Party Talks that occurred from 2003 to 
2007.  These talks will only be successful, however, if the United 
States abandons its hostile approach and makes a concerted effort 
to be cooperative and respectful.  This will allow for the drafting of 
improved treaties and agreements and, more importantly, it may 
make North Korea more committed to honoring its promises of 
disarmament. 
On December 12, 2002, North Korea stated that its decision to 
“refreeze” its nuclear program depended “entirely . . . on the 
 
79 See id. art. III(B)(4) (providing further enforcement options through the 
Security Council because of its status as the “organ bearing the main 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”). 
80 See DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER 
CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER 206 (2001) (discussing the remedies available to 
member states who challenge council decisions). 
81 Id. at 207. 
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attitude” of the United States.82  The “attitude” of the United States 
during this time, however, was one of antagonism and disrespect.  
For instance, in his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush 
categorized North Korea as a part of the “Axis of Evil,” prompting 
the North Korea Foreign Ministry to describe the act as “little short 
of declaring a war against” the country.83  On February 5, 2003, 
then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described North Korea 
as a “terrorist regime” that had the capability of selling nuclear 
weapons technology and materials to terrorists and rogue 
nations.84  This statement only resulted in apologies from senior 
administration officials and angered North Korea,85
Another obstacle that continually stands in the way of U.S.-
North Korea negotiations are the preconditions these countries 
established both prior to and convening at the bargaining table.  
During the Three-Party Talks that occurred between April 23 and 
April 25 in 2003, for example, North Korea proposed to suspend its 
nuclear program in exchange for energy and aid.
 likely 
contributing to a delay in the commencement of the Six-Party 
Talks.  As inconsequential as comments and “attitudes” may seem, 
they play an important role in affecting U.S.-North Korean 
diplomatic relations.  Broad characterizations do not appear to 
accomplish anything but increased hostility and should therefore 
be kept to a minimum to facilitate successful future negotiations. 
86  The U.S., 
however, insisted that it would meet North Korea’s demands only 
after it “scrap[ped] its nuclear program.”87
 
82 Paul Kerr, North Korea Quits NPT, Says It Will Restart Nuclear Facilities, 
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2003, available at http://www.armscontrol.org 
/print/1195. 
  It went on to demand 
North Korea’s “complete[], verifiabl[e] and irreversibl[e]” 
83 Bush’s ‘Evil Axis’ Comment Stirs Critics, BBC NEWS, Feb. 2, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1796034.stm. 
84 James Dao, Bush Administration Defends Its Approach on North Korea, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at A13. 
85 See id. (describing North Korea’s negative response to Rumsfeld’s 
statement). 
86 See generally Pyongyang Allegedly Hints Nuclear Possession at “3-Party Talks”; 
Makes “New Bold Proposal,” PEOPLE’S KOREA, http://www1.korea-
np.co.jp/pk/191th_issue/2003042601.htm (discussing the details of the Three 
Party Talks). 
87 Id. 
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disarmament as a precondition to any future talks.88  This resulted 
in a stalemate that was only broken after China served as a 
mediator to bring the two parties together for the first round of the 
Six-Party talks on August 27–29, 2003.89
Again, there was no progress in negotiations, as the United 
States demanded that North Korea end its nuclear programs before 
it would offer economic assistance and diplomatic normalization, 
while North Korea insisted that the U.S. first offer security 
guarantees.
 
90  Therefore, to ensure that future negotiations are 
successful, both parties need to approach the bargaining table 
without preconditions and with a willingness to compromise.  No 
country can be expected to jeopardize the safety of its citizens and 
make itself vulnerable to attack based on another country’s 
promise.  If it is indeed the case that North Korea “can never 
accept” the demand that it drop its nuclear program first,91 the 
most reasonable approach would allow for the two countries to 
begin efforts simultaneously, instead of chronologically.92
This diplomatic policy of compromise should extend to the 
types of negotiations the United States is willing to enter.  North 
Korea has consistently insisted on its dislike of multilateral 
negotiations and its desire to conduct direct negotiations with the 
United States.
 
93
 
88 U.S. Urged to Accept DPRK-Proposed Simultaneous Package Solution, KOREAN 
CENT. NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 15, 2003, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003 
/200312/news12/16.htm. 
  Despite this fact, the United States has consistently 
89 See generally Tae-Hwan Kwak, The Six-Party Nuclear Talks: An Evaluation 
and Policy Recommendations, Remarks at the 45th Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association 6 (Mar. 17, 2004) (unpublished paper, on file 
with Eastern Kentucky University) (analyzing the origin of the Korean nuclear 
crisis, evaluating the six-party talk as an effective framework for resolving the 
nuclear issue, and providing recommendations for resolving the North Korean 
nuclear issue). 
90 See id. at 6–7 (discussing the interactions between each member of the Six-
Party Talks). 
91 U.S. Urged to Accept Simultaneous Action and Package Solution, KOREAN CENT. 
NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 1, 2003, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200312/news12 
/02.htm. 
92 See generally, Keynote Speeches Made at Six-Way Talks, KOREAN CENT. NEWS 
AGENCY, Aug. 29, 2003, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200308/news08 
/30.htm (outlining North Korea’s proposal for a package solution and the 
principle of simultaneous actions). 
93 See Ed Henry et al., N. Korea Feels ‘Owed’ Direct Talks With U.S., Richardson 
Says, CNN, Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08 
/19/us.north.korea.richardson/index.html?iref=allsearch (“North Korea believes 
it’s owed bilateral talks with the United States after the communist government 
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forced North Korea to negotiate within a multilateral framework.94  
Only recently, this policy led North Korea to vow “never again [to] 
take part in” the Six Party Talks in response to a U.S.-backed UN 
Security Council resolution condemning its April 5, 2009 satellite 
launch.95  Although “internationaliz[ing]”96
Overall, the United States must abandon its hard-line policy of 
inflexibility if it hopes to bring about North Korea’s disarmament.  
Chinese Vice Minister Wang Yi put it best when he said, “the main 
problem we are facing” is not North Korean, but U.S. policy.
 the nuclear issue is 
considered a key protection for the international community, the 
United States should take any opportunity to negotiate with North 
Korea.  If North Korea believed in the process leading to a future 
agreement, it might be far more likely comply with the ultimate 
agreement. 
97
While it is important that the United States does not make 
concessions that endanger its interests, it should adopt a 
diplomatic policy that allows for the assignment of compensation.  
By offering incentives for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear 
program, the United States provides “a face-saving way” for North 
Korea’s President to achieve the disarmament of his country.
 
98
 
released two detained American journalists . . . .”); Gov. Bill Richardson on North 
Korea’s Nuclear Weapons, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Aug. 19, 2009), 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/08/19/gov_bill_richardson_on_
north_koreas_nukes_97971.html (“[T]he issue is should that dialogue be in the 
context of the six-party talks which the United States wants with the other Asian 
countries or bilaterally as the North Koreans want, directly U.S./North Korea.”); 
N. Korea for No-War Pact with USA, TRIBUNE INDIA, Jan. 31, 2003, 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030201/world.htm#5 (“We are not only 
opposed to any attempt to internationalise the nuclear issue on the Korean 
peninsula but also we will never participate in any form of multilateral talks.”) 
(quoting North Korea’s ambassador in Beijing). 
  The 
United States should not view concessions as “reward[s],” but 
should rather view them as an essential means to gaining North 
94 See Kwak, supra note 89, at 5 (“The U.S. has insisted that the North Korean 
nuclear crisis be resolved . . . within a multilateral framework, through the United 
Nations.”). 
95 Landler, supra note 34. 
96 See Kwak, supra note 90, at 5 (noting that North Korea “wants direct 
negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear issue“).  
97 Glenn Kessler, U.S. Has a Shifting Script on N. Korea, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 
2003, at A25. 
98 See Kwak, supra note 89, at 12 (discussing President Roh Moo Hyun’s 
suggestion to offer North Korea incentives for disarming its nuclear program so 
that North Korea’s President might save face). 
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Korea’s trust and respect.99  It is only fair, for instance, that “as the 
U.S. urges [North Korea] to dismantle its nuclear weapons 
completely, verifiably and irreversibly, the latter has the same right 
to demand the U.S., the dialogue partner, give it complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible security assurances.”100
The United States cannot expect North Korea to dismantle its 
nuclear program without seeing any action on the United States’ 
part until completion.  While these incentives may involve costly 
expenditures, like providing energy assistance in the form of oil, 
they may provide the key to achieving North Korea’s complete 
disarmament.  North Korean leaders will simply be more likely to 
compromise and comply with agreements if they believe they are 
being treated fairly. 
 
The United States’ “hostile” diplomatic policy towards North 
Korea is most evident in the unreceptive and inhospitable 
mannerisms of its leaders and representatives.  In the end, this 
approach only frustrates both United States and North Korean 
goals.  The North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-Gwan, 
for instance, blamed the inconclusive results of the Six-Party Talks 
in April and August 2003 on “U.S. hostile policies toward North 
Korea.”101  In fact, he commented on the discourteousness of the 
U.S. chief delegate,102 saying that “the settlement of the nuclear 
issue [would] depend entirely upon [a] change in the U.S. 
attitude.”103  This hostile attitude again frustrated United States 
objectives in 2004, when President Bush sent a curt directive to the 
U.S. delegation at the second round of the Six-Party Talks to make 
it clear that “the administration’s patience in diplomatically 
seeking North Korea’s dismantling of its weapons program could 
run out.”104
 
99 See U.S. Urged to Accept DPRK-Proposed Simultaneous Package Resolution, 
supra note 88 (analyzing shortcomings in the U.S.-North Korea nuclear 
disarmament talks, and suggesting that the United States not view incentives to 
North Korea as rewards, but rather as assurances of good faith). 
  This actually stopped the discussions the six parties 
100 Id. 
101 Kwak, supra note 89, at 16. 
102 DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-Way Talks, KOR. CENT. NEWS 
AGENCY, Feb. 29, 2004, available at http://www.nautilus.org/publications/books 
/dprkbb/multilateralTalks/DPRKSixwayTalks.html/ (saying that the U.S. chief 
delegate, “only read the prepared script without stammering and showed no 
sincerity, giving no answer even to the questions raised”). 
103 Id. 
104 Glenn Kessler, Bush Signals Patience on North Korea is Waning, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 4, 2004, at A14. 
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were having on a joint statement for finally settling the nuclear 
dispute, resulting in an empty reconfirmation of the parties’ 
commitment to denuclearizing North Korea and a delay in 
resolving important issues.105
5. CONCLUSION: CREATIVE DIPLOMACY AS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS 
OF DISARMAMENT 
  To achieve any kind of headway in 
this nuclear debate, leaders and representatives of the U.S. must 
therefore abandon their arrogance in favor of humility and respect. 
The United States should abandon its hostile diplomatic policy 
in favor of statecraft, or creative diplomacy.  This is “the art of 
developing an effective geopolitical strategy and executing it 
through the intelligent use of all appropriate instruments of 
power.”106  Statecraft challenges contemporary notions of 
diplomacy that consider mediation initiatives and sustained 
diplomatic campaigns as ineffective and overly accommodating 
means of foreign policy.  Statecraft does not abandon war and 
coercion as legitimate means of diplomacy, it only advocates that 
countries use “hard power intelligently, recognizing both its 
potential and its limits.”107
Two of the most important aspects of statecraft involve having 
“clearly defined objectives and policy consensus within 
government . . . [and] accurate, realistic assessments of obstacles 
and of the resources required to overcome them.”
  The Bush administration did not 
recognize the “limits” of its hostile foreign policy, allowing it to 
undermine its goals abroad. 
108
 
105 See Kwak, supra note 89. 
  The Obama 
administration needs to approach future negotiations with North 
Korea with a realistic and detailed plan for its disarmament.  In 
order to avoid the financial and political obstacles that prevented 
Bush’s directive essentially halted the discussions on the detailed 
statement.  China instead began to prepare for a bland statement that 
would commit the parties to continuing the talks at a later date.  But that 
effort failed as well after last-minute demands by North Korea delayed 
the closing ceremony for several hours.  In the end, the parties 
downgraded their communiqué to a ‘chairman’s statement. 
Id. at 18. 
106 Chester A. Crocker, The Art of Peace: Bringing Diplomacy Back to 
Washington, FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 2007, at 160, 161 (reviewing DENNIS ROSS, 
STATECRAFT: AND HOW TO RESTORE AMERICA’S STANDING IN THE WORLD (2007)).  
107 Id. (emphasis added). 
108 Id. 
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the successful implementation of the Agreed Framework of 1994, 
this administration needs to garner sufficient intra-governmental 
support before it becomes involved in any future disarmament 
negotiations.  Most importantly, it needs to have a clear sense of 
what it is trying to accomplish:  the complete disarmament of 
North Korea (as proposed during the Three-Party Talks in 2003), or 
the establishment of a controlled and heavily monitored nuclear 
weapon state (as permitted in the NPT). 
A “realistic assessment[] of [the] obstacles and of the resources 
required” to effect North Korea’s successful disarmament involves 
acknowledging that North Korea may not want to negotiate or 
comply with its agreements if it is not offered concessions.109
5.1. From Bush to Obama:  The United States’ Renewed Commitment 
to Creative Diplomacy 
  It 
also involves acknowledging that our hostile, and often 
discourteous, actions and attitudes have continually served as a 
major obstacle to successful negotiations with North Korea.  In the 
end, the only way we will get North Korea to comply with 
international agreements and international law is by working 
cooperatively and fairly alongside North Korea–North Koreans 
will only obey and respect laws they themselves helped craft.  
The United States’ latest use of creative diplomacy, and the 
relative success of this approach, is best illustrated by the events 
surrounding the imprisonment of American journalists, Laura Ling 
and Euna Lee.  In June 2009, the North Korean government 
sentenced these journalists to twelve years of hard labor for 
illegally entering North Korean territory.110  The North Korean 
government pardoned the women after former President Bill 
Clinton met with Kim Jong Il in North Korea and, in the words of 
the North Korean state media, “apologized”111
 
109 Id. 
 for the women’s 
actions.  Although the White House and the State Department have 
repeatedly insisted that Mr. Clinton was on a “private 
110 See Glenn Kessler, N. Korea Releases U.S. Journalists, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 
2009, at A1 (discussing the pardon that North Korea issued to two detained 
American journalists after Bill Clinton met with Kim Jong Il). 
111 See Mark Landler & Peter Baker, Clinton Secures 2 Pardons; All 3 Leave 
North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at A1 (describing the roles of Bill and 
Hillary Clinton in the release of the journalists). 
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humanitarian mission,”112 several factors suggest that the trip was 
indeed conducted on the Obama administration’s behalf.113  If 
Clinton’s trip was indeed a diplomatic move, it appears to have 
been very artfully conducted to win the respect and cooperation of 
North Korea’s Kim Jong II.  According to the Korean Central News 
Agency, Clinton’s apology was “sincere” and his manner was 
“courteous.”114
This courteous attitude was likely adopted as a means of 
remedying the fallout that occurred just two weeks earlier when 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton compared North Korea’s nuclear 
test and missile launchings to the behavior of an “attention-seeking 
teenager.”
 
115  In response to Clinton’s statement, the North 
Koreans only rejoined with further insults:  “Mrs. Clinton [is] . . . 
unaware of the elementary etiquette in the international 
community [and] . . . [s]ometimes she looks like a primary 
schoolgirl and sometimes a pensioner going shopping.”116
 
112 Kessler, supra note 110. 
  The 
113 See John R. Bolton, Op.-Ed., Clinton’s Unwise Trip to North Korea, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article 
/2009/08/04/AR2009080401486.html (claiming that “it seems that the Obama 
administration not only chose to negotiate, but to send a former president to do 
so.”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Private” Diplomacy: Following Clinton Visit, 
North Korea Pardons U.S. Journalists, DISSENTING JUSTICE (Aug. 4, 2009, 9:25 PM), 
http://dissentingjustice.blogspot.com/2009/08/private-diplomacy-following-
clinton.html (asserting that “[g]iven Clinton’s status as a former president and 
Hillary Clinton’s status as the current Secretary of State (not to mention the 
strained relations between the United States and North Korea), his visit definitely 
has diplomatic overtones, and it was possibly designed for that purpose.”); Jack 
Tapper, Former US Envoy to North Korea Ambassador Jack Pritchard: “They Needed a 
Prop. This Was the Prop,” ABC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2009, 5:31 PM), 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/08/former-us-envoy-to-north-
korea-ambassador-jack-pritchard-they-needed-a-prop-this-was-the-prop.html 
(quoting Pritchard, former US Ambassador to North Korea: “it’s not a personal 
mission . . . clearly the administration wanted to insulate themselves.  They 
wanted in the public’s and particularly in the North Koreans’ mind for this to be 
seen a [sic] separate issue other than the nuclear issue that’s going on.”); see also 
Landler & Baker, supra note 111 (stating that the initiative “came after weeks of 
back-channel talks between the United States and North Korea through its United 
Nations mission”). 
114 See Kessler, supra note 110 (reporting that “Clinton expressed words of 
sincere apology to Kim Jong Il for the hostile acts committed by the two American 
journalists.”) 
115 Landler & Baker, supra note 111. 
116 Mark Landler, Clinton and North Korea Engage in Tense Exchange, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 2009, at A10 (describing the “acrimonious exchange[s]” between 
Hillary Clinton and Kim Jong Il). 
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North Korean’s focus on Mrs. Clinton’s lack of “etiquette” points to 
the importance of good manners in successful international 
relations.  This exchange clearly frustrated America’s efforts at 
disarming North Korea, as the majority of the banter occurred 
during a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
and it thereby overshadowed and “competed for attention with 
Mrs. Clinton’s campaign to marshal worldwide pressure on the 
North Koreans to dismantle their nuclear weapons program.”117  
The North Korean’s ill will was most evident when they reiterated 
at a news conference on the same day that they “would never 
return to multiparty talks.”118
In changing its approach to North Korea, the United States 
clearly made an “accurate, realistic assessment[] of [the] 
obstacles”
 
119 posed by these hostile confrontations with North 
Korea.  King Jong II could never oblige a country whose leaders 
publicly hurl humiliating insults at him without losing the respect 
of his own people.  The United States clearly realized this, as Mrs. 
Clinton “moderated her tone with regard to the case, moving from 
declaring in June that the charges [against the journalists] were 
‘absolutely without merit or foundation’ to saying [in July] that the 
journalists ‘are deeply regretful, and we are very sorry it’s 
happened.’”120
The importance of civility and respect in the international 
relations arena is further evidenced by the fact that, for Kim Jong 
II, the freeing and pardoning of the women was a “reciprocal 
humanitarian gesture” in response to Mr. Clinton’s decision during 
his presidency to send Mr. Kim a letter of condolence on the death 
of his father.
 
121
The international community has taken note of President 
Obama’s embrace of creative diplomacy, as he was recently 
awarded the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize for his “extraordinary efforts 
to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between 
  Clearly, the past and present approaches exhibited 
by Mr. Clinton were instrumental in securing the freedom of these 
American journalists. 
 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 See Crocker, supra note 106 (arguing that a deeper understanding of the 
interplay between diplomacy, strategy, and power is essential to successful U.S. 
foreign relations). 
120 Kessler, supra note 110. 
121 Landler & Baker, supra note 111. 
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peoples.”122  In describing its decision to award Obama, the 
Norwegian Nobel Committee noted that “[m]ultilateral diplomacy 
has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the 
United Nations and other international institutions can play.  
Dialogue and negotiations are preferred as instruments for 
resolving even the most difficult international conflicts.”123
Multilateralism is defined as “any system associating several 
states which are united by equal and mutual obligations, by 
common rules.”
 
124  Former President George W. Bush was heavily 
criticized during his presidency for “an excessive reliance on 
unilateral action and U.S. military power.”125
Since being awarded the Nobel Prize, President Obama has 
delivered on his promise to utilize less hostile tactics in the United 
State’s international affairs.  In April 2009, President Obama issued 
a call for the creation of a summit that would address the problem 
of nuclear terrorism by “bolstering international cooperation and 
improving security for nuclear materials worldwide.”
  The Committee 
therefore awarded President Obama the Nobel Prize in hopes that 
it would encourage the president to continue utilizing international 
institutions as a means of seeking cooperation and compromise 
with other countries. 
126
 
122 Obama: Nobel Peace Prize is “Call to Action”, CNN WORLD (Oct. 9, 2009), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-09/world/nobel.peace.prize_1_norwegian-nobel 
-committee-international-diplomacy-and-cooperation-nuclear-weapons?_s=PM 
:WORLD. 
  Last April 
in Washington, D.C., the Global Nuclear Security Summit brought 
over forty nations and several international organizations together 
to discuss “the nature of the threat and develop steps that can be 
taken together to secure vulnerable materials, combat nuclear 
123 Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace Prize for 
2009 (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace 
/laureates/2009/press.html. 
124 Philippe Moreau Defarges, Le Multilatéralisme et la Fin de l’Histoire, 3 
POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE 575, 576 (2004) (Gregory Eliott trans.), 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/0104Moreau_Defarges_gb.pdf. 
125 Obama: Nobel Peace Prize is “Call to Action”, supra note 122. 
126 John Isaacs & Leonor Tomero, Fact Sheet: 2010 Global Nuclear Security 
Summit, CTR. FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION (Dec. 9, 2009), 
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearweapons/articles/120909_glo
bal_nuclear_security_summit/. 
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smuggling and deter, detect, and disrupt attempts at nuclear 
terrorism.”127
President Obama clearly hopes to affect the disarmament of 
North Korea, and other countries presenting nuclear threats, 
through negotiation, respect, and cooperation and, if the results of 
Mr. Clinton’s visit to North Korea are any indication of the value of 
creative diplomacy, this new approach will be an effective one. 
 
 
127 Press Release, The White House, Addressing the Nuclear Threat: Fulfilling 
the Promise of Prague at the L’Aquila Summit (July 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Addressing-the-Nuclear-Threat-
Fulfilling-the-Promise-of-Prague-at-the-LAquila-Summit/ (emphasis added) 
(discussing President Obama’s three-part strategy to address the international 
nuclear threat). 
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